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English Prime is a language prescription advocating the abolition of all forms of the verb 
“to be” from usage. Such benefits of a “to be”-less form of communication might include an 
increased appreciation for the essential complexity of reality and the intangibility of certain 
forms of knowledge. However, to date, no English Prime claims have been rigorously examined 
in an empirical manner. A program of research systematically assessed individual differences in 
the use of the verb “to be” to determine their relationship to outcomes described by English 
Prime scholars. Relations between English Prime violations and the following theoretically 
relevant measures were examined: dialectical endorsement, temporal nonlinearity, interpersonal 
complexity, the dialectical self, arrogance, and neuroticism. No support was found for English 
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 Epistemology, the formal study of knowledge, dates to the ancient Greeks and persists as 
an area that inspires heated debate in the area of philosophy today (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2012). What we know, are capable of knowing, and are able to express in terms of knowledge is 
indeed a fundamental question and tension of human existence. The rich history of epistemology 
has been dominated by some of the most famous and well-known historical figures to have lived, 
including Plato, Bacon, Descartes, and Aristotle. Knowledge is a fundamental component of the 
human experience that permeates every facet of our lives. How do we know where we parked our 
car? What do we know about HIV and how to protect ourselves? What does our friend know that 
we do not? What we believe to objectively know influences our self-concepts (e.g., Boucher & 
O’Dowd, 2011; Schlegel, Hicks, King, & Arndt, 2011), our interpersonal functioning 
(Sanbonmatsu, Uchino, & Birmingham, 2011), and the manner in which our minds operate (e.g., 
Wilson & Bai, 2010). It is this intimate, proximate, and personal form of knowledge that is the 
focal point of the current line of research. 
Subjectivity, Language, and Knowledge: General Semantics 
 Korzybski (1933) introduced what he termed "general semantics", a proposed eradication 
of and departure from categories of Aristotlean logic that he deemed to be detrimental to both 
rational and scientific pursuits. Primarily, Korzybski confronted Aristotlean “truth logic”, akin to 
binary logic, being that something either is or is not true in absolute terms. It was argued that 
humans do not possess the physical or mental hardware to objectively observe or know such 
binary terms of truth and that this is most obvious in the manner in which we employ language. 
Specifically, he felt that the absolute application of labels (e.g., he is a liar), identity (e.g., I am 
an extravert), and the delineation of events or states in time (e.g., it is an election) are violations 
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of imposing what he referred to as an “is essence” upon things that possess greater complexities 
and dynamic variations than essentialist language allows for. Korzybski’s primary claim was that 
these are merely descriptions of such objects, concepts, and events in time that can only be 
known subjectively, and should be treated as such within our language. That is, the inherent 
complexity of the natural world and state of the universe cannot be meaningfully 
compartmentalized in order to understand it in objective terms.  
Rather, it was stated that humans tend to engage in such practices as a way to make their 
lives easier, but potentially at a great cost. This practice conceptually over-simplifies the actual 
complexity of events, the world, and objects in it and, in doing so, may render us less sensitive 
and able to adapt to changing circumstances. Further, Korzybski (1933; 1938) stated that it is 
when we reify our own subjective experiences as objectively true, we inherently default to 
believing that the incongruent subjective experiences of others are absolutely and objectively 
false. This sort of problem creates conflict between people, groups, or nations that have different 
subjective belief systems, and inevitably so. As a result, such “to be”-like thinking was argued to 
facilitate arguments, social discord between groups, and even wars. Language was seen to be not 
only a marker of an implicit belief of objectivity being assigned to our senses and thoughts, but a 
cause of this state of affairs and the interpersonal issues stemming from it. 
 It was suggested that a greater appreciation for the complexities of reality can be 
achieved through the modification of language usage such that it reflects the subjectivity of 
knowledge. Specifically, Korzybski (1933) proposed to eliminate various manifestations of the 
verb "to be" from use within the English language. Traditionally, the verb "to be" and its 
conjugates are used to convey such concepts as binary value (something either "is" or "is not"), 
the same Aristotlean logic from which Korzybski (1933) sought to depart. For example, it is 
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impossible to objectively know that another person is intoxicated; one only concludes from 
inference that another person appears intoxicated as derived from various forms of information 
(e.g., seeing the person swagger while walking, smelling alcohol on their breath). This 
assumption may be entirely incorrect (e.g., the person may have had a seizure or be sick). 
Furthermore, intoxication is very much a graded property as well as a dynamic state, not a fixed, 
binary reality. The “to be” functionalization in the form of a state-description (implying truth or 
falsehood in an objective sense) superimposes a sense of an objective, absolute state wherein it 
does not actually exist. In the elimination of “to be” words, language more accurately reflects the 
subjective nature of cognition and perception, which may better correspond to the inherent 
complexity of reality and, therefore, greatly aid in the preclusion of erroneous conclusions. 
Distillation of General Semantics: English Prime 
 The progression of general semantics has been maintained by subsequent generations of 
linguists. The strongest proponent of such language reformation has been D. David Bourland. 
Bourland (1952) took Korzybski's call for reformation to an extreme position, prescribing the 
absolute abolishment of the verb "to be" in all of its forms (e.g., “is”, “are”, “am”), in all 
contexts, from all modes of thought and extending processes thereof, especially communication; 
this framework has been labeled “English Prime”. The described rationale is largely parallel to 
that of Korzybski (Bourland & Johnston, 1997), including the epistemic consequences that 
should follow. While acknowledging that there are certain instantiations of “to be” that appear to 
be appropriate in their conveyance of finality or equivalence, such as in mathematics (e.g., “A is 
A; A is not B”), he stated that such concepts are able to be accurately conveyed without relying 
upon this verb and its conjugates (e.g., “A = A; A ≠ B”). 
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 The psychological consequences stemming from the adoption of English Prime as a form 
of communication have been articulated by proponents of English Prime and are thought to 
extend to cognitive, interpersonal, and affective realms (e.g., Kellogg, 1987). For example, 
removing “to be” words might result in a reduction in dogmatism, which can only occur to the 
extent that one reifies their belief system as objectively true (Johnson, 2009; Korzybski, 1958; 
Wilson, 1989). English Prime has been advocated as an instructional tool for writing (Ralph, 
1991; Scott, 1989), a bolsterer of critical thinking and creativity (Kellogg & Bourland, 1990), 
and a source of improvement in interpersonal functioning (Johnston, 1989; Scott, 1989), all 
supposedly impacted by the cognitive changes arising from the elimination of “to be”.  
In the fields of psychology and psychotherapy, Albert Ellis was a known advocate of 
English Prime (Ellis, 1999). His theory of psychopathology emphasizes the overly-general, 
negative self-statements that catalyze unnecessary fatalism and psychological suffering among 
patients (e.g., “I am a failure”, “life is hopeless”). He would point out that such statements often 
lacked a firm, evidentiary basis. For example, an individual is unlikely to always be a failure; 
most individuals are able to readily retrospect upon past examples of success. Accordingly, and 
consistent with the prescription of English Prime advocates, patients were guided in correcting 
their negative self-statements such that they were more subjectively accurate (e.g., “I feel like a 
failure right now”, “life seems hopeless at the moment”). Such statements are consistent with the 
nature of affect and promote a self-concept with greater malleability, recognizing that the future 
has the potential to be drastically different than the past and present with regard to 




English Prime and Corresponding Psychological Precedent 
The list of purported cognitive changes that originate from the embracement of English 
Prime has grown as time has passed. Various articles, books, and symposia have promoted the 
assertion that successfully avoiding “to be” words has definite, observable outcomes at the 
individual level (The Institute of General Semantics, 2012). Unfortunately, to date, no rigorous 
empirical testing has been performed on the exclusively anecdotal accounts of such outcomes. 
Claims of cognitive change made by both past and contemporary English Prime advocates have 
largely remained isolated to a community comprised solely of such advocates. This has left 
testable hypotheses “on the shelf”, despite their verisimilitude. 
When one eliminates “to be” words from one’s language and thought, one’s apprehension 
of the self and the world are thought to become more flexible and nuanced, with a greater 
appreciation of change (Bourland & Johnston, 1997). Just such a mode of thinking appears to 
characterize Eastern (e.g., Japan, Korea, China) cognition (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Therefore, even within a culture, people who avoid “to be” words may be characterized by many 
of the cognitive patterns associated with a more Eastern mode of thinking. Indeed, whereas 
Western thought traditionally follows Aristotlean logic, Eastern thought does not, but rather 
follows traditions (such as Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist) that are characterized by an appreciation 
of change and paradox (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). 
It is important to note, however, that cross-cultural differences are a crude way of 
examining cognitive styles that operate in a manner that is largely driven by individual 
differences within, as opposed to between, cultures. That is, it must be recognized that people 
within a culture vary considerably in terms of whether they are flexible in their thinking about 
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self, time, and context (Lieber & Yu, 2003; Markman, Grimm, & Kim, 2009; Oishi, Diener, 
Napa-Scollon, & Biswas-Diener, 2004). Hence, although cross-cultural studies provided a basis 
for selecting some dependent measures for use in the present studies, these measures are rooted 
in examining differences in cognitive styles, which is also the overarching focus of English 
Prime theorizing (Bourland & Johnston, 1997). Indeed, the study of individual differences and 
language use possesses a history of research that applies to the current research inquiries. I will 
first discuss the utility of language analysis for the purposes of the current research interests, then 
detail specific hypotheses for the current research based upon English Prime Theory that will be 
assessed using such techniques. 
Language Analysis and Individual Differences 
 Language can be computer-analyzed in terms of the frequency with which meaningful 
categories of language are used by the individual. In general, language category frequencies have 
been shown to exhibit meaningful variations both as a function of context (Pennebaker, 2011) 
and persons (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). Further, individual differences in 
language use are established at early ages and persist across the lifespan (Richards, 1990). These 
differences have been described as indicative of underlying cognitive styles, being reflective of a 
system of thought (Chomsky, 2011). Accordingly, preexisting individual differences in English 
Prime violations (namely, the use of “to be” words, which are censured) may reflect something 
intrinsic to the individual; that is, different degrees of violation might be indicative of inherent 
differences in the way in which people cognitively function, interpret, and mentally map reality. 
 Language analysis has already been identified as a viable implicit measure of individual 
differences that helps avoid some of the pitfalls associated with both traditional, self-report 
measures and some more contemporary implicit assessment paradigms (e.g., the implicit 
 7 
 
association task; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). Furthermore, such techniques have 
already been demonstrated to be of high utility within the field. Stable individual differences in 
personality and language usage are able to be ascertained via language analysis (Mehl, Gosling, 
& Pennebaker, 2006). Language categories tend to exhibit high test-retest reliability 
(Pennebaker, 2007) and have been shown to be important in making nuanced distinctions in 
individual differences research (Arntz, Hawke, Barnelis, Spinhoven, & Molendijk, 2012). 
Importantly, individual differences in cognitive style have been demonstrated to be reflected by 
language use in areas such as attributional style (Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988; Peterson 
& Ulrey, 1994), integrative complexity (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993), and goal processes 
(Stein, Folkman, Trabasso, & Richards, 1997). In sum, the analytic techniques invoked for the 
purposes of the current research are well-established and fruitful. Findings suggesting that stable 
cognitive and individual difference trends are able to be elucidated via language analysis 
techniques offer strong encouragement for their application to English Prime research. 
Hypotheses 
Recognition of complexity, fluidity, and nuance of the world, in tandem with a 
recognition of subjectivity in perception and cognition, are mainstays of both English Prime 
theory and previous psychological research. This set of qualities is diverse, however, and can 
manifest itself in different realms (e.g., how the self is conceptualized, whether time is seen as a 
linear or curvilinear entity, etc.) both within and between cultures. Cognitive styles and 
individual traits purported to be related to English Prime adoption possess empirical precedent in 
studies of culture and cognition as well as personality, facilitating an integration of English 
Prime postulations with previous psychological measures from these realms. Six constructs will 
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be discussed in turn, with specific hypotheses stated for each construct with regards to how it is 
expected to correspond to English Prime violations (use of “to be” conjugates) in language. 
Stability of self-construal has been explored extensively by researchers interested in how 
individuals vary across social situations in terms of social cognition (see Medvene, Grosch, & 
Swink, 2011). Terminology has varied as a function of focus, however, research suggests that 
stable individual differences exist with regards to the manner in which the self is cognitively 
construed across social interactions in terms of emotions (Kang & Shaver, 2004), interpersonal 
functioning (see Streufert & Nogami, 1989), self-improvement (Heine et al., 2001), and 
leadership potential (Hunsaker, 2007). Generally speaking, the cognitive style of dynamic self-
construal across situations appears to be a stable individual difference construct that is reflective 
of both behavioral (e.g., Täuber & Sassenberg, 2012) and self-pertinent cognition (Chiao et al., 
2009) across situations. English Prime theory explicitly links violations of doctrine with 
inflexibility of self-labeling across social situations as a result of self-concept malleability 
(Johnson, 1989), creating an organic fit for this hypothesis within the context of interpersonal 
complexity research. It is therefore predicted that greater violations in English Prime should 
correspond to lesser flexibility in the construal of the self across social roles. 
 Recent research in dialecticism has studied notions of simultaneity in incongruent 
cognitions largely in terms of emotions (e.g., Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, & Wang, 2010) and 
cognition (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009), nested within the context of 
Eastern versus Western culture. Importantly, cognitive flexibility with regard to consideration, 
and even acceptance, of conflicting views have been described in terms of stable individual 
differences (Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008; Ricco, 2010). Similarly, Scott (1989) has 
stated that the elimination of “to be” words drives a propensity to view the world in shades of 
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probability statements and cognitive flexibility in viewing multiple perspectives simultaneously. 
Conceptually, then, dialecticism, specifically the endorsement of it, should exhibit a positive 
relationship with English Prime violations as such violations are theorized to correspond to 
binary conceptualizations of truth, thus precluding simultaneous advocacy of inconsistent 
concepts. 
 Predictions about the future with an implicit allowance for change has been studied in 
terms of cognition nested with culture (e.g., Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001), again with an Eastern 
versus Western cultural focus. Accounting for change propensity in predictions has been 
established as an individual difference variable and, broadly, related to individual differences in 
epistemic and existential cognition (e.g., Van Pachterbeke, Keller, & Saroglou, 2012) and 
information processing (Hussy & Scheller, 1976). With regards to English Prime theory, 
Bourland (2004) proposed that liberation from “to be” facilitates a proclivity towards making 
predictions of future trends and events, in cognitive terms, in a manner that precludes rigid 
reliance upon past trends. This connection of absolutes in cognition to trend prediction informs 
the hypothesis that greater violations in English Prime doctrine should correspond to greater 
adherence to past trends in the prediction of future outcomes. 
An extension of the previously mentioned research on dialecticism is that of trait-level, 
self-relevant complexity and dialectical cognition held by the individual pertaining to the self 
(e.g., tolerance for contradiction and awareness of change; see Lutz & Ross, 2003). These reflect 
larger, complex patterns of thought that apply to the self, a topic that is often reserved for unique 
metacognitive processes (see Brinol & DeMarree, 2012; Proust, 2003). English Prime theory 
suggests that such metacognitive processes are linked to “to be” words (Dawes, 2010; Ralph, 
1991) in that “to be” disallows the flexibility and inconsistencies about the self. As such, it is 
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predicted that greater violations of English Prime will correspond to lower characterizations of 
the self as dialectic in nature. 
 Humility is seen to be opposite to arrogance (e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weber, 2006; 
Wiggins & Trobst, 1997), an important interpersonal trait that has been explored in contexts such 
as relationships (Kowalski, Walker, Wilkinson, Queen, & Sharpe, 2003), creativity (Silvia, 
Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011), and social dysfunction (Summers & Summers, 
2006). Interpersonal arrogance has been linked to brain regions associated with agentic cognition 
(Sollberger et al., 2009), agency being an implicit component of “to be” cognition (Bourland & 
Johnston, 1997). The trait of humility has been described as a direct outcome of English Prime 
adoption as well (e.g., Wilson, 1989). In agreement with English Prime theory, psychological 
theory has postulated relationships between truth-pertinent cognition to arrogance through beliefs 
of agency (hubris; e.g., Crichton-Miller, 1947; Weber, 2006). As such, greater violations of 
English Prime are predicted to correspond to greater arrogance. 
 Lastly, it is reasonable to suspect that a decrement in beliefs about a concrete, 
objectively-knowable reality may correspond to existential, in addition to general, anxiety and 
negative affect (Lacovou, 2011). Such anxiety is considered a facet of the neuroticism domain 
for individual differences (see Rosellini & Brown, 2011), which is marked by a tendency to 
experience and a susceptibility to stressors, anxiety, and negative affect (see Suls, 2001). This is 
precisely the outcome described by Dawes (2010) with regards to the elimination of English 
Prime violations from thought and language. “To be” words may, in fact, provide a degree of 
existential security, serving as a buffer against anxiety. As such, it is predicted that greater 
English Prime violations will predict lower levels of anxiety, as measured by trait neuroticism. 
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STUDY 1: IMPLICIT ASSESSMENT 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 69 participants (29 female) were recruited from North Dakota State University 
via the web-based SONA research platform. Participants, each being assigned to a private 
cubicle space, independently participated in the study within a laboratory setting in groups of 6 
or less. All tasks performed by the participants were completed via desktop computers loaded 
with a standard, 32-bit distribution of the Windows XP operating system. All tasks were 
performed via custom-created scripts, programmed by the author, and were executed using E-
Prime 2.0 and MediaLab software. 
Computer-based Writing Assessment 
 The writing assessment portion of the study consisted of a two-part, guided writing task 
intended to capture individual differences in social cognition – i.e., how we think about the self 
and others. Each facet of the assessment was comprised of a prompt followed by a writing 
procedure. The first prompt (“When you think about YOURSELF, what do you think about?...”) 
requested that individuals write about themselves for 5 minutes. The second writing prompt 
(“When you think about OTHER PEOPLE, what do you think about?...”) requested that the 
participants write about other people for 5 minutes. All participants engaged in both writing 
tasks; text was compiled across both tasks for the purpose of having a larger text sample per 
participant that was not topic-specific. 
 In order to create scores for English Prime violations, I employed the Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count 2007 software (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). This software 
performs a complete scan of text input and records the prominence of a designated language 
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category in terms of the percentage of words matching tokens for that category. Using a custom-
built language dictionary consisting of all forms and conjugates of "to be" (Beyer, 2007), all text 
provided by participants was analyzed and compiled into a single composite score, by 
participant, across writing conditions (M = 5.54, SD = 1.59).1,2  Higher values of such scores, 
then, reflect greater reliance upon and instantiation of "to be" conjugates (greater English Prime 
violations) in one's language, with the opposite being true for lower values. 
Interpersonal Complexity Task 
 In order to assess the individual's interpersonal complexity, I employed a modified 
version of Suh's (2002) identity consistency paradigm. Participants were asked to report the 
degree to which various adjectives are characteristic of the self in different social contexts. Six 
adjectives (anxious, helpful, talkative, demanding, practical, spontaneous) that are descriptive 
markers of various traits (e.g., neurotic, agreeable, extraverted) in conjunction with five 
interaction partners (e.g., a close friend, a stranger, parents) were presented onscreen to the 
participants. The prompt consisted of: "When I am interacting with [interaction partner], I 
generally tend to be…". Participants were asked to rank order the six traits from 1 (most 
characteristic) to 6 (least characteristic) in each particular social role. A static guide was present 
onscreen throughout the duration of the task in order to ensure that the participants understood 
the task as they performed it; a full instruction set was also readily accessible to the participants 
during the entirety of the task. 
Scoring of interpersonal complexity was performed in a manner parallel to that described 
by Suh (2002; see also: Block, 1961; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993). A 5 (role) X 6 
(adjective) within-subject matrix was constructed for each participant and was derived from their 
rank-ordering of adjectives across roles. Each matrix was then subjected to a principal axis factor 
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analysis. It has been shown that the first factor resulting from such procedures reflects the extent 
to which people view their personalities as static across roles. The amount of variance accounted 
for by the first factor, then, was used as the participant's interpersonal complexity score, with 
higher values reflecting lower levels of this construct. The mean and standard deviation of the 
measure (M = 50.43% variance explained, SD = 10.22% variance explained) suggest that the 
measure was adequate and possessed acceptable amounts of variance for the purposes of 
detecting any relationships with English Prime. 
Dialectical Endorsement Task 
 I employed a modified version of the protocol used by Friedman, Chen, and Vaid (2006) 
in order to assess each participant’s endorsement of dialectical statements. 20 proverbs were 
selected from their protocol, 10 dialectical (e.g., "Everybody's business is nobody's business") 
and 10 non-dialectical (e.g., "Sorrow will pay no debt"), that were highly prototypical of these 
two categories. The twenty proverbs were presented to participants onscreen, one at a time, in a 
randomized fashion. Participants were asked to indicate their endorsement of each proverb on a 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
For each participant, two composite scores were compiled: dialectical endorsement and 
non-dialectical endorsement. These scores were generated by averaging across each participant's 
endorsement ratings of the proverbs from their respective categories. A difference score was then 
created by subtracting non-dialectical endorsement from dialectical endorsement, with higher 
values of this score reflecting a differential preference for acknowledging nuance and complexity 
in the world, at least upon the basis of proverbs seen to possess wisdom. Participants generally 
displayed a mild preference for dialectical proverbs (M = .23, SD = .57), suggesting that this 
phenomenon is not necessarily driven by a Western versus Eastern cultural influence. 
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Temporal Nonlinearity Task 
 In order to assess an appreciation for complexity in trends over time, I employed a 
modified version of the Ji, Nisbett, and Su (2001) study paradigm, which found that nonlinearity 
in temporal prediction was more characteristic of Chinese than American participants, consistent 
with a more complex view of how events unfold over time. Participants were instructed that they 
would see a series of graphs consisting of two data points that were said to be representative of 
real trends across time (e.g., annual Indonesian rainfall, wheat prices in Kuala Lumpur). They 
were then asked to predict where a third data point would fall at a future time for each graph. 
Each graph (total of 15) consisted of three time points that were labeled as being the past value 
(time point 1), present value (time point 2) and future value (time point 3), represented by equal 
spacing along the X-axis. The first two data points were fixed; their Y-axis positions were 
chosen at random, however, subject to the constraint that a third point along the same linear 
precedent would fit within the graph. Using their mouse, the participants were asked to 
guesstimate Time 3’s position along the Y-axis of the graph; the X-axis position remained fixed. 
This procedure enabled us to discern the extent to which trends occurring in the past are seen to 
be indicative of how events typically proceed into the future. 
In order to ascertain the degree to which participants perceive the world in a temporally 
non-linear manner, a score was created for each participant reflecting their deviation from an 
established trend. For each trial, the slope from Time 1 to Time 2 was calculated. Using this 
slope, the predicted point (assuming a linear trend) for Time 3 was thus established. The degree 
to which participants then diverged from this point was scored in terms of pixel values. An 
average divergence from linearity was then calculated for each participant, which showed an 
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acceptable amount of variation (M = 56.25, SD = 38.60) with consideration to the overall screen 
resolution (1600 x 1200 pixels). 
Results 
English Prime violations were found to be not significantly correlated to interpersonal 
complexity, r(67) = -.15, p = .21. This held true for both males, r(39) = -.24, p = .12, as well as 
females, r(26) = .04, p = .85. English Prime violations were also found to not significantly 
correlate with differential dialectical proverb endorsement, r(67) = .19, p = .11. This remained 
true both for males, r(39) = .08, p = .60, as well as females, r(26) = .23, p = .25. Finally, English 
Prime violations were significantly correlated with temporal non-linearity in predictions, r(67) = 
.26, p < .05; this runs conceptually counter to assertions by English Prime theorists. This 
relationship appeared to be unreliable and driven almost exclusively by female participants, r(26) 
= .42, p < .05, as the relationship was rather weak and not significant among male participants, 
r(39) = .14, p = .38. 
Discussion 
People did differ in the frequency with which they used “to be” words. A greater use of 
such words, according to English Prime theorists, is reflective of a thinking style that promotes 
dispositional thinking with regards to the self, an inability to appreciate paradox, and tendencies 
to assume that what was true in the past would be true in the future as well. Three measures were 
designed to assess these three sorts of constructs; in no case was there evidence in support of 
such hypotheses. In the one instance where a significant correlation was found, it was not only in 
the wrong direction, but its reliability is questionable owing to non-replication among males. The 
dependent measures of Study 1 were relatively subtle and implicit. It is possible that predictions 
consistent with English Prime theorizing would fare better with a more explicit approach in 
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which people should be quite conscious of the constructs being assessed. This is the approach 
taken with Study 2. 
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STUDY 2: EXPLICIT ASSESSMENT 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 141 participants (52 female) were recruited in the same manner as has been 
described for Study 1. Participants initially completed the same writing task as was detailed for 
Study 1 and similarly engaged in all assessment tasks via computer. The writing task was scored 
in a manner congruent with Study 1, with the task revealing highly similar outcomes in terms of 
English Prime violations among participants (M = 5.46, SD = 1.51). 
Dialectic Self Measure 
 Tendencies toward dialectical thinking with respect to the self were assessed using the 
Dialectical Self Scale (DSS, Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). This measure consists of 32 items 
rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Sample items include: “When I hear 
two sides of an argument, I often agree with both”; “I sometimes believe two things that 
contradict each other”; and “I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different 
contexts.” Prior research has indicated that the DSS possesses admirable psychometric 
properties, shows both convergent and discriminant validity, and displays sensitivity to 
hypothesized cultural differences (Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004). An overall 
composite score of this scale was created for the purposes of analysis that suggested individuals 
tended towards only a slight degree of dialecticism with regards to the self (M = 3.68, SD = .54; 
α = .78). 
Arrogance Measure 
 Arrogance was assessed by means of self-report in response to items reflecting the 
arrogance-unassuming vector of the Interpersonal Adjective Scale - Revised (IAS-R, Wiggins, 
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Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988). Participants rated the extent to which (1 = extremely inaccurate; 5 = 
extremely accurate) they could be characterized in terms of 16 personality adjectives marking 
this dimension. The 8 arrogant markers include sly, cunning, tricky, calculating, crafty, cocky, 
boastful, and wily. The 8 unassuming items include unwily, uncunning, unsly, boastless, 
unargumentative, undemanding, uncrafty, and uncalculating. Arrogance and unassumingness are 
bipolar in theory and exhibit bipolarity in structural terms as well (Wiggins, Phillips, & Trapnell, 
1989). Therefore, arrogance was scored in dimensional terms by reverse-scoring the unassuming 
markers and then averaging across all 16 items, revealing a slight proclivity towards 
interpersonal arrogance among the participants (M = 3.66, SD = .79, α = .88).  
Neuroticism Measure 
 Finally, trait neuroticism was assessed by asking participants to respond to items 
reflecting the neuroticism factor of Goldberg’s (1999) Big-Five assessment; this measure has 
performed exceedingly well in previous studies (for a review, see Robinson & Gordon, 2011). 
Participants rated the extent to which (1 = very inaccurate; 5 = very accurate) various statements 
describe them in general. This measure consists of 10 items (2 reverse coded). Examples include 
phrases such as “I worry about things”, “I get irritated easily”, and “I change my mood a lot”. An 
average score was compiled for each participant for analysis (M = 2.61, SD = .85, α = .90).  
Results and Discussion 
 In order to examine the relationship between English Prime violations and each of the 
preceding measures, Pearson’s correlations were conducted. English Prime violations were not 
predictive of lower Dialectical Self scores, r(139) = .11, p = .17. This was true for males, r(87) = 
.11, p = .33, as well as females, r(50) = .14, p = .31. Further, the hypothesized relationship 
between English Prime violations and trait arrogance was not found, r(139) = .09, p = .29. This 
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was true for males, r(87) = .15, p = .16, as well as females, r(50) = -.13, p = .36. Finally, 
variations in English Prime violations did not predict dispositions toward anxiety as assessed by 
the trait of neuroticism, r(139) = .05, p = .57. This was true for males, r(87) = .10, p = .35, as 
well as females, r(50) = .01, p = .92. 
Study 2 focused on explicit measures in which people were directly asked to characterize 
themselves. It was hoped that such measures, which are not only more explicit but also 
potentially more reliable and stable than those in Study 1, would reveal evidence for differences 
by the use of “to be” words (versus their lesser use). There were no significant correlations 
despite the more than adequate sample size and the fact that English Prime theorists often refer to 




 English Prime theorists and advocates have asserted a relationship between a broad 
domain of cognitive and trait outcomes and reduced instantiations of the verb “to be”; the current 
research is the first known attempt towards imposing empirical scrutiny upon such claims. I 
selected measures that reflect constructs implicated by English Prime advocates as correlates of 
“to be” in language usage, predicting that greater violations of English Prime would correspond 
to: (1) greater rigidity across different role contexts; (2) a diminished capacity to advocate 
dialectical or paradoxical proverbs; (3) perceive time to be a linear entity; (4) possess a self-
concept in which conflicting facets are precluded; (5) exhibit greater arrogance; and (6) display 
lesser anxiety via trait neuroticism. Such measures were found to manifest no meaningful, 
hypothesized relationship with English Prime violations in language patterns.  
English Prime recommendations are ultimately recommendations about individual 
differences in language use; the LIWC approach to language use has exhibited excellent support 
for just such an individual differences stance. Accordingly, I constructed a dictionary of “to be” 
words and derivatives whose use varied considerably across participants. Despite adequate 
sample sizes, especially in Study 2, there simply were no meaningful, hypothesized correlations 
between the use of these words and cognitive styles consistent with rigidity versus flexibility, nor 
were correlations with personality variables significant. Overall, hypotheses of English Prime as 
theory found no purchase in the current studies. 
Reasons for Null Findings 
  The writing task included in the two presented studies was designed in such a manner as 
to tap into social cognition specifically. While social cognition overlaps with a broad set of 
cognitive constructs (see Gawronski & Payne, 2010), it is possible that this selection of focus for 
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writing was in fact too myopic for the purposes of the current research. The social arena is 
merely one of many in which specific types of interaction, perception, and mentation occur 
(Cavigelli, Michael, West, & Klein, 2011; Dunning, 2011), allowing for the prospect that this 
construct was too narrow in scope to elicit sufficient language-evident cognition pertinent to 
constructs hypothesized to be relevant to English Prime. Furthermore, the writing samples 
gathered for these studies were relatively discrepant from the typical amount and style of 
language employed by the average individual even within a typical day (e.g., Patrick & Whalen, 
1992). Lastly, there is the alternative possibility that generally stable individual differences in “to 
be” usage simply do not exist.3 English Prime violations in language patterns may be highly 
transient and unstable or, alternatively, topic-specific. 
 The dependent measures employed for the current research were selected on the basis of 
their conceptual implication on the part of English Prime advocates in conjunction with their 
conceptual overlap with previous psychological research, those largely being research in the area 
of culture and cognition. Such measures may not have been ideal in their ability to acquire an 
understanding of individual differences with regards to the constructs theorized to be of 
importance by English Prime advocates, or may be inherently less reliable and predictable than 
desired. Indeed, our measures suggested that individuals in our first sample tended towards 
endorsing dialectical, relative to non-dialectical, proverbs, whereas Westerners would not be 
expected to exhibit such endorsement based upon previous findings (e.g., Friedman, Chen, & 
Vaid, 2006). Measures such as dogmatism may in fact more closely pertain to the concepts of the 
individual reifying their own beliefs as true than, for example, arrogance, being reflective of 
more abstract social cognitive tendencies. Nevertheless, these measures are believed to reflect 
constructs have been rather explicitly stated by English Prime advocates as relating to “to be” 
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words. Additionally, well-validated measures of other, more proximal theorized constructs (e.g., 
neuroticism, interpersonal complexity) also exhibited no significant or meaningful relationships 
with English Prime violations. 
Exploring the links between English Prime and its outcomes may be fruitful under more 
highly stringent guidelines. Application of the English language is saturated with “to be” and its 
conjugates and, thus, the hypothesized corresponding Aristotlean “truth logic” may be automatic 
and overtrained in the individual irrespective of its overt appearance in language. Without 
concrete, explicit reason to speak and mentate contrarily, there is, in fact, little motivation for the 
average individual to avoid such words and thinking (Korzybski, 1933; 1938). As such, it is 
possible that intensive training would be necessary to free the individual from this system of 
language and cognition; this would be consistent with current research pertaining to language 
structure and cognition (see Lucy, 2010). Such training, however, would need to be mindful of 
well-documented thought suppression phenomena such as the “white bear” effect (see Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). It may be difficult to train individuals to avoid “to be” verbs 
without inadvertently facilitating their prominence in cognition and language generation 
processes; such effects have been described by English Prime proponents as being particularly 
arduous to circumvent (Bourland, 1990; DeWitt, 1989; Johnson, 1988; Scott, 1989). As such, the 
current measures may be useful only in detecting differences between those who do not employ 
English Prime versus those who have great experience and practice in employing the doctrine; 
such concepts are highly prominent in other areas of research with mindfulness experts (see 
Baer, 2006; Chiesa, 2009; Treadway & Lazar, 2009). 
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English Prime as a Belief System 
 Natural variations in “to be” verb usage may alone not be predictive of the outcomes 
proposed by English Prime advocates. A common thread to anecdotal reports by advocates of the 
theory and its practice is that all advocates are not only explicitly aware of the theory behind the 
practice, but possess specific, desired outcomes when undertaking English Prime by actively 
engaging in its prescribed language modifications. This potential confound would distinguish the 
practice of English Prime as simply symbolic of a belief system rather than a true prescription 
that substantively causes desired outcomes (see Tiba, 2010). That is, in the pursuit of specific 
cognitive and trait-like outcomes, the beliefs surrounding English Prime (e.g., thinking in a non-
rigid manner, appreciation of complexity and change, perception as a means of inference instead 
of objective “knowing”) might be of greater consequence than the use of “to be” words per se. 
Explicitly embracing such a belief system by enforcing principles derived from this belief may 
very well moderate the relationship between English Prime adherence and outcomes espoused by 
proponents of its theory. That is, it is possible that low levels of English Prime violations predict 
outcomes pertaining to specific cognitive and behavioral patterns, as well as trait outcomes, only 
in conjunction with an understanding and adoption of beliefs about why such a relationship 
should exist.  
In terms of application, it has been noted by Korzybski (1933), as well as subsequent 
theorists (e.g., Bourland & Johnston 1997), that the instantiation of “to be” conjugates is indeed 
highly functional in terms of evolutionary adaption. For example, threatening stimuli are 
proposed to be processed in a highly automatized and efficient manner (e.g., Brosch & Wieser, 
2011). In the event of threatening or noxious stimuli in one’s environment, it behooves the 
individual to both think and behave in highly encapsulated, concrete terms. Recent research 
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suggests that, especially in the event of threatening stimuli, attention is driven in a bottom-up 
manner, potentially optimizing threat detection and evasion (Cornwell, Mueller, Kaplan, Grillon, 
& Ernst, 2012). Therefore, the functionality of “to be” words, even if demonstrated to pertain to 
outcomes described by English Prime theorists in the course of future research, do indeed 
possess important utility within certain contexts. For example, when decisiveness and certainty 
are favored in a given context (e.g., threat appraisal, orientation within new environments, under 
cognitive taxation, and collaborative efforts), such efficient, heuristic modes of processing and 
thinking about the world are highly desirable (Elliot, Payen, Brisswalter, Cury, & Thayer, 2011; 
Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, 2012; Vogel‐Walcutt, Gebrim, Bowers, Carper, & 
Nicholson, 2011). Such considerations of context and efficiency should be treated as important 
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1The dictionary codes for the following English Prime violations: ain't, aint, am, are, 
aren't, be, been, being, hain't, here's, heres, he's, hes, how's, hows, I'm, Im, is, isn't, isnt, it's, she's, 
shes, that's, thats, there's, theres, they're, theyre, was, wasn't, wasnt, we're, weren't, werent, 
whatcha, what's, whats, where's, wheres, who's, whos, you're, and youre. 
2Analyses were also conducted in which separate “self” scores and “other” scores were 
used to predict the dependent measures. Results were parallel to the results created from a 
composite score across the two separate essay prompts. 
3 For both studies, English Prime violations when writing about the self and others were 
not strongly or significantly correlated, both r’s < .16, p’s > .05. 
